

WASHINGTON WINDOW; REAGAN: YEAR OF POLITICAL TRIUMPHS WITH A FEW CLOUDS  
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For President Reagan, 1984 will be remembered as a year of personal political triumph, clouded at times by missed opportunities and even failure in the areas of domestic and foreign policy.

There is no doubt that Reagan can look back over the last few months with a sense of personal satisfaction. After a 20-year career in politics, he climaxed his last hurrah with a landslide re-election victory of historic proportions.

Reagan also saw signs of a long-awaited U.S.-Soviet thaw toward the end of an election year that saw him drop the harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric common through most of his first term to portray himself to the voters as a man of peace.

But there were a number of episodes over the last 12 months that Reagan and his lieutenants may prefer to forget as they chart a course for his second term. Some were temporary irritants, others likely to be recurrent problems over the next four years.

Clashes of personalities, egos and ideas continued within the administration, with Reagan -- ever the loyal boss -- reluctant to intervene and ever ready to stand by a subordinate in trouble.

Just days into 1984, Reagan announced he would nominate presidential counselor Edwin Meese, a longtime aide, to succeed William French Smith as attorney general.

But Meese became the target of myriad allegations of improper or unethical conduct. His Senate confirmation was held in limbo as his personal affairs were probed by members of Congress and a special prosecutor.

The case fueled charges by Democrats of a "sleaze factor" in the administration of the "Teflon-coated" president. Meese was cleared, but too late to take his new Cabinet post. His nomination will be among the first orders of business when the new Congress convenes.

Also on the personnel front, Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan, no stranger to criminal investigations during the first Reagan term, became the first sitting Cabinet member to be indicted.

At a less visible level, there was continued sniping among factions within the administration, most often characterized as a feud between hard-core conservatives and more pragmatic -- even moderate -- presidential aides and advisers.

As an adjunct to this infighting, a House subcommittee ended its inquiry into how President Carter's briefing books ended up in the Reagan camp in 1980.

CIA Director William Casey was in the news more than he preferred to be. He was summoned to Capitol Hill to explain the CIA's involvement in mining Nicaraguan harbors and in preparing a manual for Nicaraguan rebels that was interpreted by some members of Congress as a sanction to commit political assassination.

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## NICARAGUA REBELS ACCUSED OF ABUSES

### Senator Predicts Investigation of Reports of Atrocities

By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26 — Members of Congress and other Government officials say many reports of abuses by Nicaraguan rebels against civilians have come to their attention recently as a result of Congressional investigations of the C.I.A.'s manual on guerrilla warfare.

Present and former rebel leaders said in interviews over the last few weeks that some of their guerrillas had been guilty of atrocities. The leaders said they deplored the acts, and they contended that they had evidence that the Sandinistas were guilty of the same kinds of abuses.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is a senior member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said the committee was likely to investigate the reports of atrocities next year.

#### Evidence About Crimes

In testimony to the House Select Committee on Intelligence this month, the members of Congress and other sources said, Central Intelligence Agency officials and others presented evidence that the United States-backed rebels had raped, tortured and killed unarmed civilians, including children.

The C.I.A. officials were said to have raised that problem as one explanation for the guerrilla warfare manual, saying the primer was intended to moderate the rebels' behavior. But that explanation only irritated some members of Congress, who said the agency had not told them of the problem before.

Members of Congress and the other sources said that among the reports that have come to their attention, along with the classified briefings from senior C.I.A. officials, were direct, sworn testimony from at least one rebel leader; press accounts, and reports and affidavits from private individuals and organizations that have interviewed victims and witnesses in Central America.

The reports have included accounts about groups of civilians, including women and children, who were burned, dismembered, blinded or beheaded, the sources said.

Congress ended aid to the rebels last spring but is to consider renewing aid early next year. Democratic members of Congress who are familiar with the atrocity reports said the issue was likely to bolster opposition to renewing the aid.

#### C.I.A. Offered Reports

Early this month, Representative Edward P. Boland, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, said C.I.A. officers had offered the reports of atrocities as one explanation for the agency's guerrilla warfare manual.

The C.I.A. officials, including Director William J. Casey, told the committee that "they were concerned about the stories of kidnappings and assassinations" of civilians, Mr. Boland said.

The agency published the guerrilla warfare manual so the rebels "could win the hearts and minds of the Nicaraguan population," Mr. Boland quoted the C.I.A. officers as telling his committee.

The manual advised rebels to kidnap Sandinistas, to "neutralize" selected Government officials, to blackmail ordinary citizens so they would be forced to join the rebel cause, and to hire criminals who would arrange the shooting deaths of fellow rebels so they would become martyrs. The manual also included advice on political propagandizing intended to persuade Nicaraguans to become rebel sympathizers.

#### Behavior Said to Improve

In separate interviews, rebel leaders said they did not know whether the number of soldiers disciplined for abuses had increased or decreased in the year since the manual was issued. But one rebel official, Bosco Matamoros, said the rebels' behavior had gradually improved over the years.

"We have a voluminous file on Sandinista atrocities" as well, Mr. Matamoros said.

He said the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the largest rebel group, had documented "several hundred cases" of rebel abuses against civilians in the last two years. The abuses have ranged from petty theft to murder, he said.

He and other rebel leaders described the problem as a regrettable but inevitable byproduct of civil war and added that their military courts had issued sentences ranging from demotion to imprisonment each time an abuse was discovered.

Alfonso Callejas, a member of the rebel group's directorate, said: "It is very difficult to control an irregular army. Many soldiers join because they have people they want to get even with."

#### Chamorro Briefed Committee

In an interview, a former rebel leader, Edgar Chamorro, said he told the House Intelligence Committee in closed testimony last month that some rebel commanders routinely executed their prisoners, even though rebel leaders found the practice "sickening and disgusting."

"The practice was common," Mr. Chamorro said, "but it definitely was not our policy."

Mr. Chamorro testified to the House Intelligence Committee for more than two hours one day in November. The other members of the rebel directorate dismissed Mr. Chamorro from the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, partly because of his public discussion of the atrocity issue.

This month, the Center for Constitutional Rights, a New York civil liberties group, gave the House Intelligence Committee more than 150 pages of written testimony gathered by its attorneys on rebel atrocities.

The center sued the Reagan Administration two years ago on behalf of a dozen Nicaraguan citizens who said they or members of their family were victims of rebel abuses.

#### Suit Ruled Political

In one case, the center's testimony said, the rebels "kidnapped and slit the throats of 18 peasants and burned their houses." The suit was dismissed as a "political question" beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and is on appeal. This month, the center appended the C.I.A. manual and related information to its appeal, saying the information bolstered the case.

An Americas Watch report published last April says: "In the northwestern mountain areas, the F.D.N. has engaged repeatedly in kidnappings, torture and murder of unarmed civilians, mostly in villages and farm cooperatives." It cited one case last December when villagers were "tortured to death."

Several leaders of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force said Sandinista Government officials and their sympathizers had been publicizing the atrocity issue.

Adolfo Calero, chairman of the F.D.N., said the Sandinistas had carried on "an orchestrated campaign to make resistance fighters appear as atrocious terrorists." He added: "We draw our very blood from the civilians they say we are killing."

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# Shadow of Somoza Haunts Rebels' Image

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## *U.S. Is Hardening Stand on Nicaragua*

By Joanne Omang  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration has agreed after long internal debate that the United States cannot live with Nicaragua's Sandinista government until there is fundamental change in its domestic politics, according to administration officials.

Hardening its Central American negotiating demands, the administration has gone beyond its stress on change in Nicaragua's external policies—its support for leftist rebels elsewhere and its ties to the Soviet bloc.

Now, while those are still major goals, they are seen as byproducts that will occur only when there is basic change in Managua.

Policy-makers are divided, however, on whether change can come under the leftist Sandinista rulers or whether the Sandinistas themselves must be replaced. Everything else, as one high official put it, is "merely tactics" for President Reagan's second term.

The administration is agreed that Nicaragua must have "genuine domestic pluralism" with a free press, unrestricted campaigning by the domestic political opposition, and U.S.-style elections open to anyone—including, eventually, leaders of the armed rebel opposition known as "contras."

A socialist economy, while annoying to U.S. officials, would be acceptable if political democracy prevails, according to these sources.

If it does not become a model democratic state, as another high administration official put it, "nobody expects that over a long period of time they [the Sandinistas] wouldn't promote external revolution."

The new focus has broad implications for ultimate U.S. action in the area. It ends talk of a possible live-and-let-live approach in which the United States would stop harassing Nicaragua no matter what its internal situation in return for verifiable Sandinista oaths to keep hands off other countries.

It also raises the question of how far the administration is prepared to go to achieve its objectives.

Langhorne A. (Tony) Motley, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, said in an interview that the use of U.S. ground forces is a "boundary" of U.S. policy.

"There are two things the American people do not want," he said. "On the one hand, another Cuba on the mainland of Central America; that is, a Marxist-Leninist regime out there exporting their revolution, creating mischief," and on the other hand "another Vietnam... which translates into the ground use of U.S. troops in Central America."

U.S. policy, Motley said, is "inside those two boundaries."

Motley said he would speak only for the record, to distinguish himself from those who "float private agendas" on condition they not be named. He indicated that the administration position followed "a considerable amount of frustration" over Nicaragua's Nov. 4 elections—which President Reagan called "a farce"—and over its continuing import of Soviet arms.

"These present another hurdle to a normalized relationship," he said.

The elections, Motley said, prove that Nicaragua's commitment to the terms of the Contadora peace treaty proposal is hollow, a charge Nicaragua denies. The buildup means that any treaty verification will be "all but impossible," he said.

Other officials concur, and the

U.S. position in continuing talks has hardened accordingly.

In the White House view now, for example, any serious peace treaty would require hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people to verify compliance.

"We're thinking in terms of the Sinai force; a big, serious operation if it's going to work at all," one high official said, referring to the 1978-79 U.N. peacekeeping effort in the Sinai peninsula. That program involved 4,000 troops at its height.

The faction that sees some hope of converting the Sandinistas to a democratic view, led by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, has been pursuing a normalized relationship through bilateral talks with Nicaragua and in the Contadora negotiations, named after the Panamanian island where Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama launched the talks last year.

There are persistent reports both that Shultz wants more emphasis on the talks, and that special envoy Harry Shlaudeman, who has met nine times with Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Tinoco, has been hamstrung in his talks by negotiating limits imposed on him from above.

These are said to be authored by the hard-liners, allegedly led by Deputy Defense Secretary Fred C. Ikle and CIA Director William J. Casey, who think there is little point in talking to communists since any agreement will be violated.

But State Department officials who are viewed as moderates and others involved in the talks vehemently deny the reports.

No matter how officials feel about the value of negotiations, they agree that continued military pressure on Nicaragua from the contras is critical to further progress, either to induce negotiating concessions or to provoke a domestic rebellion that ousts the Sandinistas.

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# U.S. Aides Reported Deadlocked Over Nicaragua

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By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 — The Reagan Administration is deadlocked over the development of new approaches for dealing with Nicaragua, according to senior national security officials.

Many senior officials said they believe that the current policy, which was introduced three years ago on the premise that Congress would provide aid to Nicaraguan rebels, has become unrealistic and out of step with developments in Nicaragua and Washington.

As a result, a number of new policy options have been proposed in recent weeks but none have proven acceptable to a majority of officials.

One proposal, presented by the Defense Department in late November, called for recognizing the rebels as the legitimate government of Nicaragua and then asking Congress to give them overt military aid. It was later withdrawn because of lack of support within the Administration, the officials said.

## A Range of Proposals

They reported that other options, ranging from the use of military force against Nicaragua to negotiation of a political settlement, are also opposed by many senior officials.

After President Reagan's re-election, Administration officials said, Secretary of State George P. Shultz pressed the White House to approve an intensification of diplomatic approaches to Nicaragua. They said he appeared to be gaining support when the Administration's attention was diverted in mid-November by the Soviet Union's offer to conduct talks about renewing arms limitation negotiations.

"The two main alternatives to current policy — outright military intervention or a political solution — are both unacceptable, but there's no agreement on what else to do," one State Department official said.

The current policy, which rests on the conclusion that Nicaragua has served as a base for Soviet and Cuban subversion in Central America, has emphasized the use of the rebels to press the Sandinistas to modify their behavior.

The current concern centers on whether the rebels can counter, without further American aid, the recent

acquisition by Nicaragua of new Soviet weapons, including heavily armed and maneuverable MI-24 attack helicopters that are considered especially effective against insurgent forces.

## Future of Aid Uncertain

In October, as part of a budget compromise, Congress approved \$14 million in covert aid for the rebels in the current fiscal year, but stipulated that no money be spent unless it renews approval some time after March 1, 1985. Renewal is considered unlikely, particularly in the House, which has repeatedly voted against additional support.

Although the rebels have sustained themselves in recent months with private donations and help from other governments, some Administration officials question whether the insurgents can survive through 1985 without American aid. If the rebels collapse, many Administration officials believe, United States policy will be at a dead end.

For that reason, the officials said, the Pentagon, at the direction of Fred C. Iklé, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, proposed transferring diplomatic recognition to the rebels and asking Congress to provide them with the same kind of overt military assistance that the United States gives to many nations.

## U.S. Military Role Feared

The recommendation was withdrawn, according to Pentagon and State Department officials, in the face of strong opposition from the State Department, including warnings that if the United States recognized the rebels and gave them military aid, Washington might ultimately be forced to come to their defense with American military force.

Mr. Iklé said in a telephone interview on Friday, "I do not comment on inter-agency deliberations."

He added, "If the freedom fighters are let down, it's unlikely that the Sandinistas will depart from the course that they have taken since 1979, namely to build up a very powerful military establishment and totalitarian regime at home and later to use this strength to create new trouble for their neighbors."

Mr. Iklé also said he had "noted with interest" a recent article in The Washington Post that quoted Senator Dave

Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, as saying aid to the rebels should not be part of a covert intelligence program but would be acceptable in other forms. Mr. Durenberger is expected to become the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence when the new Congress meets in January.

## Three Key Officials

The stalemate within the Administration over Nicaragua is said to revolve around three key officials, Mr. Shultz, Mr. Iklé and William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence.

According to Administration colleagues, each man and the agency he represents advocate a somewhat different approach toward Nicaragua.

Although there is a consensus among the three men and within the Administration that the military buildup in Nicaragua should be curtailed and that the Sandinistas must move toward democratic rule, there are major differences over how to achieve those goals, according to White House, State Department and Pentagon officials involved in the shaping of policy toward Nicaragua.

Mr. Shultz, the officials said, has advocated seeking a political settlement through direct talks between Washington and Managua and through the effort of four Latin American nations to develop a regional peace plan for Central America.

## Current Policy Defended

Mr. Shultz and his aides at the State Department believe the current policy has been reasonably successful in keeping the Sandinistas off balance, creating an opportunity for a political solution if acceptable terms can be negotiated.

"We've got a long-term strategy and we should stick with it," an aide to Mr. Shultz said. He added, "We can't toss it overboard every few years and try something different."

Mr. Shultz and the State Department, the officials said, wanted to use direct talks between the United States and Nicaragua to develop an agreement that could be incorporated into the regional peace plan being developed by the Contadora group, which consists of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia.

One State Department official familiar with the direct talks, which have been held periodically since June in the

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